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  This paper considers the whether offering multiple lotto games within a state by joining a 
multi-state lottery increases total ticket sales compared to offering a single state game. The 
question is considered from two different perspectives, which both lead to the conclusion that 
states do tend to benefit from increased ticket sales overall by joining a multi-state lottery 
association. There is, however, a noted difference in the magnitude of that effect depending on 
the size of the average jackpots of the previously existing state games. 
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Introduction 
 
  While national, state, and local governments offer a variety of legalized gambling 
products through lottery associations, among the most popular, and the focus of this study, is the 
set of games known as “lotto,” where players select five or six numbers from among 35 to 55 
choices (depending on the structure of the game) and win prizes based on the numbers that are 
correctly matched in a weekly or bi-weekly drawing. A ticket buyer(s) who matches all of the 
numbers wins the jackpot prize pool while players matching some but not all of the winning 
numbers win smaller consolation prizes. A unique feature of lotto is that in most games if the 
jackpot prize is not won in a particular drawing, the money allocated to the jackpot is carried 
over into the next drawing and is added to funds from ticket sales in the next period. Because the 
jackpot prize fund is allowed to roll-over in this manner, the jackpot prize can become quite 
large if no one hits the jackpot in a number of successive periods. Indeed, advertised jackpots 
exceeding $50 million are quite common, and occasionally lotto jackpots have been known to 
exceed $300 million. 
  As of September 2006, 42 states and the District of Columbia had government run 
lotteries all of which offered at least one lotto game with a roll-over jackpot. Every state except 
Florida belonged to one of the two major multi-state associations, the twenty-seven state Multi-
State Lottery Association (Powerball) or the twelve state Big Game/Mega-Millions association. 
In addition, many states also sell tickets to either another multi-state game or a state lotto that 
typically offers lower jackpot prizes but better odds. See Table 1 for a list of state lotteries and 
the lotto games they offer. Note that Table 1 includes only lotto games with a roll-over jackpot. 
Many states offer lotto-type games that again have players select five or six numbers from 
among 35 to 55 choices (depending on the structure of the game) and win prizes based on the   4
numbers that are correctly matched in a weekly or bi-weekly drawing, but if the jackpot prize is 
not won in a particular drawing, the money is not carried over into the next drawing. In these 
games, if the jackpot prize is not won, either the funds allocated to the jackpot prize pool accrue 
to the lottery authority or the funds “roll-down” to the lower prize tiers and increase the prize 
amounts received by winners in the other prize categories. 
  In the 1970s and 1980s, lottery associations began to experiment with the idea that by 
offering games with longer odds but bigger grand-prizes, they could attract more buyers. Forrest 
et al., (2002) have suggested that lotto players are attracted by the high jackpots and not the 
expected return, and lotto is popular due to the “skewness” of the bet rather than its expected 
return. Lottery associations realized, however, that if the odds were too high, jackpots would be 
won very infrequently, and, therefore, the games would not benefit from frequent media 
exposure surrounding jackpot winners. Lottery officials were forced to choose between offering 
games with high jackpots and ones with frequent winners. 
  To this end, in the mid 1970s, state and provincial lottery associations began to join 
together to offer lotto games beginning with the formation of the Western Canada Lottery 
Corporation in 1974, the Tri-State Lotto, joining Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, in 1985, 
the Multi-State Lottery Corporation (now more commonly known as Powerball) in 1988, and the 
Big Game/Mega-Millions Association in 1996. By merging games, states could offer larger 
jackpots, but the increased number of players would assure that the grand prize was won on a 
regular basis.  
Clotfelter and Cook (1993) suggest that the optimal (or at least most frequent) odds to 
population ratio for lotto games in the early 1990s was roughly 1. That is, a lottery association 
serving a population base of 13 million could offer a game with odds of roughly 1 in 13 million   5
and maintain a reasonable frequency of jackpot winners. Until the early 2000s, this meant that 
states with smaller populations generally offered lotto by being a member of one of the two 
major multi-state games (Powerball and Big Game/Mega-Millions) while more populous states 
could offer high prizes through independent lotto games. For example, as of January 2000, eight 
states (CA, TX, NY, FL, PA, OH, WA, and CO) operated lotto games but not did belong to a 
multi-state game. Of these eight states, six ranked among the seven largest states by population. 
By the early 2000s, however, perhaps due to the record $300 million plus jackpots 
offered during several Powerball and Mega-Millions drawings, even these hold-out states began 
to join in the multi-state associations so that by July 2005, only Florida remained independent 
from any multi-state lotto game. Similarly, the national lottery associations of the UK, France 
and Spain have joined together in February 2004 to offer EuroMillions, which offers among the 
highest jackpots in Europe. 
Lottery associations ultimately must make a choice when faced with the option to join a 
multi-state (or multi-country) lottery between joining the multi-state game, offering an 
independent game, or selling tickets to both an independent game and the multi-state lotto game. 
As shown in Table 1, different lottery associations have made different choices in this regard. 
Four lottery associations offer only one roll-over lotto game, twenty offer two games, fifteen 
offer three games, and four state lotteries offer four different games.  
The particular focus of this paper is whether offering multiple lotto games increases total 
ticket sales for the lottery association and under what conditions does joining a large multi-state 
lottery increase total ticket sales. On the one hand, offering multiple games offers players a 
variety of games that may appeal to different players depending on the current jackpots, odds of 
winning, and the players’ individual preferences. On the other hand, if the pool of money that   6
players make available for gambling is fixed, the introduction of a new game will simply result 
in substitution from one game to another, cannibalize the existing game, and lead to no net 
increase in lottery revenues. Lottery revenues may even fall if players have difficulty easily 
identifying when games achieve particularly high jackpot levels. For example, a 49-choose-6 
state lotto game with a 1 in 13 million chance of winning the grand prize might be a particularly 
attractive bet if the jackpot reaches $50 million and would normally have attracted a large 
number of bettors prior to the introduction of one of the “mega games.” However, in the 
presence of the Powerball or MegaMillions games, which routinely advertise jackpots well in 
excess of $100 million, “jackpot fatigue” can easily set in for the state game.  
The issue of substitution among lottery games is not new to the literature.  Clotfelter and 
Cook (1989) test the effects of introducing lotto games on the sales of scratch-card tickets.  
Stover (1990) finds significant substitution effects between lotteries run by contiguous states.  
Gulley and Scott (1993), in part of a larger paper, consider the question of whether the two state 
lotto games in Massachuesetts, the Mass Millions and Mass Megabucks games, serve as 
substitutes for one another, finding no significant relationship between the two.  Forrest, Gully 
and Simmons (2004) find evidence of some substitution among the variety of games offered by 
the United Kingdom National Lottery.  Finally, Grote and Matheson (2006) find that the 
introduction of a multi-state game does serve to reduce sales in an existing state lotto games but 
that the newly generated sales of the multi-state game exceeded the loss of sales in the state 
game in all three of the cases examined. This paper extends the work of Grote and Matheson 
(2006) by examining the introduction of the MegaMillions multi-state game to California and 
Texas. These two states are unique in that even before the introduction of MegaMillions, both 
states offered games with extremely long odds and large jackpots.  It is of particular interest in   7
this paper whether adding a multi-state game with similar odds and jackpots to the state’s lotto 
product mix significantly affects total lotto sales.  
 
Estimating the Effect of Joining a Multi-state Game – Model 1 
The most obvious way to examine the gross effects of joining a multi-state lottery would 
be to compare ticket sales from the state lotto game before the introduction of a new game to the 
combined ticket sales from both the state and multi-state lotto games after the adoption of a new 
game.  There are two limits to this approach, however.  First, state-by-state sales information for 
the larger multi-state games is not readily available for all states, precluding this as a general 
methodology. Second, and more importantly, there are likely other variables affecting the sales 
of a state’s lotto tickets besides the presence of another lottery.  To isolate the marginal effect of 
the presence of a multi-state lottery on the sales of a state lotto game, regression analysis can be 
used.  In particular, one can determine the effect on the smaller game of the member lottery by 
regressing the sales for the game on a number of independent variables that should affect sales 
and including a dummy variable for the multi-state game once the state becomes a member.  
Once the marginal effect of the multi-state game on the state game is determined through 
regression analysis, the coefficient on the dummy variable can then be compared to the in-state 
sales generated by the multi-state game (where the data is available) to determine the net effect 
on sales revenues for the state. The equation used to estimate the effect of a multi-state game on 
state lotto ticket sales is shown in equation (1). 
 
(1)   Sales = β0 + β1(Jackpot) + β2(Jackpot)
2 + β3(Trend) + β4(Multi-state) + є 
(Note: time subscripts for each variable have been dropped for simplicity.)    8
 
In addition to the Multi-state dummy variable, which takes on a value of 0 for drawings 
prior to becoming a multi-state game member and 1 thereafter, the advertised jackpot of the state 
game, advertised jackpot squared of the state game, and a time trend are also included in the first 
set of regressions.  Since the price of a lotto ticket and the odds of winning remain fixed 
regardless of the size of the jackpot, the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket 
generally rises along with the size of the jackpot.
1 It is therefore natural to assume that ticket 
sales will increase along with the advertised jackpot.  “Jackpot squared” is also included as an 
explanatory variable to reflect the non-linear relationship between ticket sales and advertised 
jackpots.  In general, ticket sales are predicted to increase at an increasing rate relative to the 
advertised jackpot.  This reflects the growing excitement about large jackpots relative to smaller 
ones.
2  “Advertised jackpot” and “advertised jackpot squared” have been included in past 
academic articles such as DeBoer (1990), Shapira and Venezia (1992), Gulley and Scott (1993), 
Scott and Gulley (1995), Matheson (2001), and Forrest, et al, (2002), as primary explanatory 
variables for a lottery draw’s sales. 
A time trend variable is also included to account for the declining popularity in lottery 
products after they are introduced to the market.  This phenomenon has also been examined in 
the literature by DeBoer (1990).  For lotteries that have drawings twice a week (which is all of 
                                                 
1The exception to this rule comes from fact that if two or more tickets share the winning 
numbers, the jackpot prize is split among the winners. If the number of ticket buyers rises more 
rapidly than the jackpot, then the expected return may actually fall despite the larger grand-prize. 
This type of occurrence, known as “Lotto Fever,” has been examined by Matheson and Grote 
(2004) and has been found to be exceedingly rare. Even on those rare occasions of “Lotto 
Fever,” the excitement of extraordinarily high advertised jackpots entices the additional purchase 
of lottery tickets despite the lower expected value of the ticket. 
2 Note that the increasing sales relative to jackpots can either be explained by the same number 
of ticket buyers buying more tickets as jackpots rise or by more ticket buyers purchasing tickets 
as the higher jackpots increase expected returns enough to attract them to the market.   9
the lotteries examined in this paper), two separate regressions will be used as there is a distinct 
difference in the relationship between advertised jackpot levels and sales for drawings that 
involve sales of tickets over weekends versus those that only involve weekday drawings.  This 
“day” effect for lotteries has been examined more closely in DeBoer (1990), among others. 
The data used to estimate equation (1) are drawing by drawing sales for the lotto games 
of five individual state lottery associations that became members of either the Multi-State 
Lottery Association (Powerball) or the multi-state Mega Millions game after they had operated 
as an independent lottery game. The five states and the dates they joined the multi-state games 
are Colorado (joined Powerball in 2001), New Jersey (joined Big Game/MegaMillions in 1999), 
Ohio (joined MegaMillions in 2002), Texas (joined MegaMillions in 2003), and California 
(joined MegaMillions in 2005). These five states were chosen for the availability of data as well 
as three other factors. First, each state added a multi-state game without making significant 
changes to their own state game at that time so that sales data for their state game are comparable 
before and after the addition of the multi-state game. Second, each state provided sufficient lotto 
sales data both before and after the adoption of the multi-state game to produce credible results. 
Finally, each state provided both sales data for their own state game as well as the sales within 
their own state for the multi-state game. Summary statistics for the five selected state lotto games 
are shown in Table 2. 
The results of the regression analyses for equation (1) are provided in Table 3. All of the 
regressions showed significant evidence of positive first-order serial correlation so the variables 
used have been adjusted using the Cochrane-Orcutt process to diminish that effect.  The Durbin-
Watson statistics of the original regressions and the rho values used to adjust the variables are 
included at the bottom of the tables.   10
  The coefficients on the “Multi-state” dummy variables in Table 3 indicate that for each 
state lotto game considered, there is a statistically significant decline in sales for the state’s own 
lotto game after it joins the multi-state game ranging from a loss of 437,507 tickets for Saturday 
drawings in Colorado to a decrease of over 4.3 million in ticket sales in Wednesday draws in 
California.  
While state lotto sales fell, in each case the magnitude of the multi-state dummy variable 
is smaller than the average per drawing multi-state ticket revenues for each state. Table 5 shows 
the average sales for the multi-state game after the game’s adoption in each state and compares 
these numbers to the coefficient on the multi-state dummy variable averaged over the two days 
for each state. As shown in Table 5, even though the states lost revenue on their own game due 
to the presence of the multi-state game, the increases in overall lotto revenues due to sales of 
multi-state tickets were greater than those losses, with Texas and New Jersey experiencing an 
increase of over one million in ticket sales per drawing. Thus, these five states seem to have 
increased overall state revenues by becoming members of the multi-state lottery. It is interesting 
to note that California, the state with an existing lotto game with prizes and odds most similar to 
the multi-state game that was added, experienced the lowest increase in ticket sales among the 
five states examined. This result becomes even more pronounced when ticket sales are analyzed 
in a more rigorous fashion in the next section. 
 
Estimating the Effect of Joining a Multi-state Game – Model 2 
Although adding a simple dummy variable for the time period during which a state also 
belongs to a multi-state game is a very straightforward approach to determining the effect on the 
sales of the smaller state lottery game, it may not be the most appropriate model. It is possible   11
that with the addition of a new game, current purchasers of tickets for a state’s own lotto game 
will not simply reduce their purchases by a fixed amount in each drawing, but will also alter their 
response to changing jackpot levels in the state game.  For example, as noted previously the 
excitement over a $50 million state-lotto jackpot is likely to be considerably reduced given the 
availability of a multi-state lottery that routinely hits jackpots many times this size. Thus, while 
ticket buyers should still respond to rising jackpots for the smaller state-run lotto games, it may 
be that their responses will be dampened after the addition of a larger and more dynamic multi-
state game. This “dampening” effect can be measured by interacting the multi-state dummy 
variable with the Jackpot and Jackpot-Squared variables in the regression analysis. The second 
equation used to estimate the effect of a multi-state game on state lotto ticket sales is shown in 
equation (2). 
 
(2) Sales  =  β0 + β1(JP) + β2(JP)
2 + β3(Trend) + β4(MS) + β4(MS x JP) + β5(MS x JP)
2 + є 
  
The regression results for equation (2) including this interaction effect are shown in Table 
4. Once the dampening effect is included, an interesting result is revealed.  For each state, the 
coefficient for the multi-state dummy variable is positive not negative as was observed in Table 
3, although in several cases the coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
However, as the advertised jackpot for the state’s lotto game increases, there is a significantly 
smaller increase in ticket sales (as indicated by the negative signs on one or both of the 
interaction slope dummies for each day and each state) for every dollar added to the jackpot after 
the state joins a multi-state game. For example, in Wednesday drawings of the Colorado Lotto, 
prior to the introduction of Powerball, an increase in the jackpot from $1 million to $2 million   12
increased ticket sales by about $161 thousand; however, after the introduction of the multi-state 
game the same increase in the jackpot would only increase ticket sales by about $35 thousand. At 
higher state jackpots, the resulting reductions in sales are even more pronounced. Similar results 
occur for each of the state lotteries examined and for each day of drawing under at least one of 
the two slope-dummy variables (if not both). 
Taking all three dummy variables into account, one can ascertain that the lotto jackpot 
does not need to grow very high in order for the overall effect on state ticket sales to become 
negative in the post multi-state era. For example, considering the Colorado Wednesday drawing, 
the state lotto jackpot has to grow to only $1.3 million dollars before the presence of the 
Powerball game begins to have a negative impact on Colorado’s Wednesday drawing ticket 
sales.  Since $1.3 million dollars is just above Colorado’s minimum jackpot prize of $1 million, 
the presence of the Powerball game in Colorado is predicted to have an increasingly negative 
impact on the Wednesday drawing ticket sales for the Colorado lottery game as the state Lotto’s 
jackpot rises. All of the other states similarly reach a negative net impact on the state game at 
relatively low jackpots. Even Lotto Texas, the game least affected by introduction of the multi-
state game has to rollover at most four drawings (and reach a jackpot of just over $11 million) 
before the overall impact becomes negative. 
The results presented here present evidence for “jackpot fatigue,” the phenomenon 
experienced by many lotteries that large jackpots spur less and less ticket buying over time.  
Essentially, ticket buyers appear to be responding less to the relatively smaller advertised 
jackpots for the state game once the multi-state game is introduced, indicating that the addition 
of a “large jackpot” multi-state game does indeed attract consumers away from the smaller ones. 
In effect, the large multi-state games are responsible for jackpot fatigue in smaller state games.   13
The results in Table 4, as a whole, also result in significantly higher F-scores and R
2’s than the 
results in Table 3, although one must be careful in attributing too much significance to this since 
the variables have been adjusted for serial correlation. 
In addition, if one uses the coefficients in Table 4 along with the observed jackpots in the 
state games after the introduction of the multi-state game, one can estimate what ticket sales 
would have been in the state games in the five states had they not joined the multi-state game. 
Again, Table 5 presents these predictions and compares them to actual ticket sales in the state 
and multi-state games to estimate a net effect of joining the multi-state lotto. The predicted 
average per drawing increase in revenues from combined ticket sales for the two games is 
approximately $380,000 for Colorado and $900,000 for Ohio, very similar outcomes to what was 
determined from the estimates in Model 1.  
Texas and New Jersey also experienced net increases in combined lotto ticket sales following the 
introduction of the multi-state game, as shown in Table 5, but the increases are much smaller 
than those estimated in Model 1. Both of these lotto games experienced unexpectedly high 
jackpots in the period following the introduction of the multi-state game, but because of the 
observed dampening effect, the increased ticket sales that the state lotto games experienced as a 
result of the high jackpots were lower than would have occurred in the absence of the multi-state 
game. For example, the jackpot for Lotto Texas for the June 19, 2004 drawing (after Texas had 
joined MegaMillions) reached a record $145 million, yet ticket sales for this drawing were lower 
than the sales for a $70 million jackpot just two years earlier (before Texas had joined a multi-
state game). Under Model 2, California actually experienced lower combined ticket sales after 
joining MegaMillions than they did when they offered only a single game.    14
The final column of Table 5 presents the most interesting results and provides an 
important lesson for lottery associations. Colorado’s combined lotto sales increased by just over 
30%, the largest percentage increase of any of the five states examined, following the 
introduction of Powerball. Colorado also had the lowest average jackpots of any of the five state 
lotto games, so that joining MUSL resulted in the addition of a lottery product that was distinctly 
different than their own existing state lotto game. New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas, with larger 
average state lotto jackpots prior to joining MegaMillions, experienced smaller percentage gains 
in total ticket sales. California, with by far the largest average jackpots and prizes rivaling those 
of the multi-state game it joined, experienced an estimated 4% decrease in combined ticket sales 
after the adoption of MegaMillions.  
 
Conclusions 
  There is little doubt that smaller state-run games lose ticket buyers when a state joins a 
multi-state lottery association. Furthermore, following the introduction of a multi-state game, 
ticket buyers within a state become less responsive to changes in the state lotto game leading to 
“jackpot fatigue.” However, the evidence suggests that the combined ticket sales of the state and 
multi-state game rise when a multi-state game is introduced.  This effect, however, is smaller for 
states with existing lotto games that offer relatively larger jackpots. In these cases, the addition 
of a large jackpot multi-state game provides relatively less additional variety to players than the 
addition of a multi-state game in a state previously offering only a low jackpot game. The 
conclusion that “variety matters” is supported even further by the result in California, the state 
that offers the highest advertised jackpots in its state game. In California, the introduction of the 
multi-state game actually reduced state lotto sales by such a large margin that these losses   15
exceeded the ticket sales in the newly introduced multi-state game.  Clearly, states should 
consider the issue of product differentiation when either choosing to join larger multi-state 
lottery games or when offering the other smaller lottery products to their residents.   16
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Table 1: State and Multi-state Lotto Games Offered in the United States 
 
State  State lotto games offered  Multi-state lotto games offered 
    
Alabama None  None 
Alaska None  None 
Arizona The  Pick  Powerball 
Arkansas None  None 
California  SuperLotto Plus, Fantasy 5  Mega-Millions 
Colorado Lotto  Powerball 
Connecticut Classic  Lotto  Powerball 
Delaware Multi-Win  Lotto  Powerball 
District of 
Columbia  Rolling Cash  Powerball, Hot Lotto 
Florida  Lotto, Mega Money  None 
Georgia Fantasy  5  Mega-Millions 
Hawaii None  None 
Idaho  None  Powerball, Wild Card Lotto 
Illinois  Lotto, Little Lotto  Mega-Millions 
Indiana Hoosier  Lotto  Powerball 
Iowa None  Powerball,  Hot  Lotto 
Kansas  Kansas Cash  Powerball, Hot Lotto 
Kentucky Cash  Ball  Powerball 
Louisiana Lotto  Powerball 
Maine  None  Powerball, Tri-state Megabucks, Triple Play 
Maryland Multi-match  Mega-Millions 
Massachusetts Megabucks,  Cash  Windfall  Mega-Millions 
Michigan  Fantasy 5, Classic Lotto 47  Mega-Millions 
Minnesota  Gopher 5, Northstar Cash  Powerball, Hot Lotto 
Mississippi None  None 
Missouri Lotto  Powerball 
Montana  Montana Cash  Powerball, Hot Lotto, Wild Card Lotto 
Nebraska Pick  5  Powerball 
Nevada None  None 
New Hampshire  None  Powerball, Tri-state Megabucks, Triple Play, Hot Lotto 
New Jersey  Pick Six, Jersey Cash 5  Mega-Millions 
New Mexico  Roadrunner Cash  Powerball 
New York  Lotto  Mega-Millions 
North Carolina  None  Powerball 
North Dakota  None  Powerball, Hot Lotto, Wild Card Lotto 
Ohio  Rolling Cash 5, Lot 'O Play  Mega-Millions 
Oklahoma None  Powerball 
Oregon Megabucks  Powerball 
Pennsylvania  Match 6, Cash 5  Powerball 
Rhode Island  Wild Money  Powerball 
South Carolina  None  Powerball 
South Dakota  Dakota Cash  Powerball, Hot Lotto, Wild Card Lotto 
Tennessee Lotto  5  Powerball 
Texas  Lotto Texas, Texas Two Step  Mega-Millions 
Utah None  None   18
Vermont  None  Powerball, Tri-state Megabucks, Triple Play 
Virginia None  Mega-Millions 
Washington Lotto,  Quinto  Mega-Millions 
West Virginia  None  Powerball, Hot Lotto 
Wisconsin Megabucks,  Badger  5  Powerball 
Wyoming None  None   19
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Data used in first two regression models 
 
  Dates  Number  of  Mean Minimum  Maximum Mean Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Mean 
Lottery  Game Covered  Observations  Sales Sales Sales  Jackpot
* Jackpot
* Jackpot
* Sales  MS  Sales 
             ( p r e v .   2   y e a r s )  
Pre  Multi-state:                
Colorado  7/14/90 - 8/4/01  1,151 1,245,818 528,779 9,297,945 3.98 1.5 27   
New Jersey  7/3/95 - 5/24/99  407 3,189,415 1,306,790 21,770,479 5.48 2 35   
Ohio  1/12/91 - 5/15/02  1,182 3,817,820 1,014,356 19,291,293 11.36 4 75   
California  6/7/00 - 6/22/05  527 11,342,066 5,830,000 104,010,000 23.45 7 193   
Texas  5/7/03 - 12/3/03  61 4,242,219 2,847,636 9,478,953 14.64 4 47   
                
Post  Multi-state:                
Colorado  8/8/01 - 6/19/04  299 459,566 265,292 1,000,848 3.85 1 16 790,516 
New Jersey  5/27/99 - 6/21/04  530 1,576,863 855,338 6,553,945 9.02 2 48.5 2,330,984 
Ohio  5/18/02 - 6/26/04  220 1,485,420 995,565 3,005,028 11.85 4 37 1,704,523 
California  6/25/05 - 7/29/06  115 7,081,130 5,030,000 19,610,000 29.65 7 110 4,208,459 
Texas  12/6/03 - 4/22/06  249 3,393,219 1,529,557 29,751,219 25.97 4 145 2,070,875 
                
*  Numbers  are  in  millions  of  dollars.                20
Table 3: Presence of Multi-State Game – Model 1 
 
  Colorado  Colorado  New Jersey  New Jersey  Ohio  Ohio  California  California  Texas  Texas 
Variable  Wed Sat Mon Th Wed Sat Wed Sat Wed Sat 





























































 (-6.29) (-6.98) (-4.53) (-3.42) (-4.84) (-5.10) (-5.07) (-5.06) (-2.60) (-2.02) 
    
N 723 725 467 467 699 701 320 320 154 154 
R-square 0.871 0.855 0.631 0.527 0.850 0.839 0.892 0.918 0.905 0.921 












DW 0.977 1.109 1.368 1.42 1.317 1.348 1.023 1.240 1.170 1.607 
Rho 0.545 0.484 0.432 0.389 0.361 0.343 0.488 .380 0.415 0.288 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level   21
Table 4: Presence of Multi-State Game – Model 2 
 
Variable  Colorado  Colorado  New Jersey  New Jersey  Ohio  Ohio  California  California  Texas  Texas 
  Wed Sat Mon Th Wed Sat Wed Sat Wed Sat 





















** 38,519 55,304.4 




























** 304,588 1,107,051 1,872,930
** 816,988 
 (2.18) (0.35) (3.78) (1.89) (3.43) (4.70) (.49) (1.38) (4.17) (1.92) 



















** 565.6 210.0 
 (-4.42) (-6.94) (-5.84) (-22.91) (-2.74) (-1.30) (-5.61) (-2.71) (.284) (.18) 
    
N 723 725 467 467 699 701 321 320 154 154 
R-square 0.932 0.927 0.917 0.956 0.902 0.896 0.961 0.958 .970 0.943 












DW 1.173 1.236 1.216 1.07 1.505 1.595 1.481 1.677 0.939 1.813 
Rho 0.435 0.389 0.405 0.486 0.254 0.206 0.258 0.161 0.807 0.152 
 
The number in parentheses below each coefficient is the respective t-score for that coefficient. 
**Significant at 1% level 
* Significant at 5% level   22
Table 5: Net Effect of Multi-state Lotto on Total Lotto Sales 
 
State 
Average state game 
sales 
Average multi-state game 
sales 
Average loss in 
state game sales 
Net gain 
State + MS 
Percentage 
gain 
Average loss in 
state game sales 
Net gain 
State + MS 
Percentage 
gain 
  (Pre multi-state game)  (Post multi-state game)  (Post MS)  (Post MS)  (Post MS)  (Post MS)  (Post MS)  (Post MS) 
      Model 1  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 2  Model 2 
Colorado  1,245,818  790,516  -439,178  351,338 28.20%  -413,149  377,367 30.29% 
New  Jersey  3,189,415  2,330,984  -1,067,006 1,263,979 39.63%  -1,933,222  397,762 12.47% 
Ohio  3,817,820  1,704,523  -800,572  903,951 23.68%  -803,788  900,735 23.59% 
California 11,342,066 4,208,459  -4,162,217  46,242  0.41%  -4,697,432  -488,973  -4.31% 
Texas  4,242,219  2,070,875  -699,624 1,371,251 32.32%  -1,558,745  512,130 12.07% 
 